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DECISION MAKING IN THE REDISTRICTING
PROCESS: APPROACHING FAIRNESS
Frank J. Macchiarola*
Joseph G. Diaz**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The following article was written by teaching lawyers who have participated
in the redistricting process of the New York City Council.' They participated,
not as academic consultants to the particular redistricting, but, as integral
members of the process from start to finish. As Chair of the 1990 New York
City Districting Commission 2 ("Commission"), Professor and Dean Frank J.
Macchiarola was primarily responsible for overseeing the districting of an enlarged
City Council for New York City. This enlargement included both numerical size
and governmental authority of the council, the City's newly constituted sole
legislative branch. Assisting the Commission throughout this process as Deputy
Counsel was Joseph Diaz.
Because of unusual circumstances that put academics at the center of a
process usually deferred to legislators, this article will depart from the traditional
perspective and style of academic writings concerning redistricting. While a
theoretical perspective runs throughout the article, it is not a customary one. The
authors are in a position to weave into the article considerations not generally
experienced by other redistricting authors. Local political realities and public
policy considerations were not simply analyzed; they were participated in. However, this is not a "how to" piece: the authors do not address the legal issue of
how to draw districts that will best satisfy the needs of local communities as well
as pass scrutiny under the Department of Justice's guidelines. The authors hope
to present a practical and realistic picture of the redistricting process as set in
New York City's local political scene.
State and local redistricting has been the subject of a great deal of writings
and study. Many disciplines, such as law, political science, and history have
focused on redistricting. While these writings say a great deal, they are generally
classified into one of three categories. The first group is descriptive history. This
* B.A., St. Francis College, 1962; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1965; Ph.D.,
Columbia University, 1970. Professor of Law and Dean, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University, and Professor, Political Science, Yeshiva University. Chair, 1990-91 New York
City Districting Commission.
**
B.A., Harvard College, 1984; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1987. Deputy
Counsel, 1990-91 New York City Districting Commission.
1. This article evolved from a conference on Urban, State and Local Government Reapportionment in which Dean Macchiarola participated as a panelist. He presented this discussion at the
annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in San Antonio, Texas earlier this year.
It has been expanded to provide a clearer presentation to the reader.
2. The Districting Commission's authority, duties and composition are controlled by Chapter
2-A of the New York City Charter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A.
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body of work reviews the history of redistricting and the relevant laws. They
capture the flavor of blatant "gerrymandering" during a time when legal remedies
did not exist for those who felt aggrieved. Regarded as a "political question,"
redistricting was not addressed by courts. More modern essays attempt to explain
the role played by the law in this area, especially with regard to racial politics,
the Voting Rights Act and its Amendments 3 and discuss issues raised and
4
outcomes of lawsuits that have emitted from the law of voting rights.
The second type of writings encompasses specific discussions of single issues
or narrow aspects of voting rights, the Voting Rights Act, a particular lawsuit
or series of lawsuits, or presents detailed guidance on how to satisfy federal,
state and local criteria.' Customarily, these articles present more thorough analyses
of specific facets of redistricting, elections and voting rights. They also focus on
how the case law has developed the entitlements of disenfranchised or aggrieved
citizens .6
The third and most recent category of writings includes critiques of the
Voting Rights Act within the purview of redistricting, laws controlling registration
and nominating procedures, and laws regulating specific systems of representation,
such as "at large" election districts or single member districts. The authors of
these writings, from both the political left and right, often argue for alternative
solutions, such as abolishing the Voting Rights Act, or the creation of new
systems of representation. Several recent articles have suggested a semi-proportional voting scheme, known as single transferable voting, as an alternative to
the present single member district schemes used by an overwhelming majority of
the states and localities. 7
In this article, the authors take a somewhat novel approach to discussions
of redistricting. By openly examining their experience with the local redistricting
of the New York City Council, the authors shed light on the actual process of
redistricting. They maintain that the process contains significant aspects other
than those of law, government and politics. It is, or should be seen as, a more

3.

4.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1988).
See generally BERNARD GROFMAN

ET AL.,

MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE

QUEST

FOR

VOTING EQUALITY: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE (1992); BERNARD GROFMAN, VOTING RIGHTS,
VOTING WRONGS: THE LEGACY OF BAKER V. CARR (1990); FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT
(1990); ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS (1987); MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, HowARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, (Chandler Davidson ed. 1984).
5.
For a comprehensive overview of recent and unresolved voting rights issues, see M. David

Gelfand, Symposium Overview - Voting Rights Development: Academic Reflections and Practical
Projections for the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 707 (1992).
6. See, e.g., BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., IDENTIFYING AND REMEDYING RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
(1991); BERNARD GROFMAN, POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS (1990); Sushma Soni,
Defining the Minority Preferred Candidate Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 99 YALE L.
J. 1651 (1990); James U. Blacksher, Drawing Single Member Districts to Comply With the Voting
Rights Amendments of 1982, 17 URB. LAW 347 (1985); Bernard Grofman et al., Representation and
Redistricting Issues 173, 185 (Scarrows eds., 1982).
7. See, e.g., Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bullwinkles: The Limitations of SingleMember Districts in a Multi- racial Context, 19 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 759 (1992); Lani Guinier, The
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 1077 (1991); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness
in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 173 (1989); Pamela S. Karlan,
Undoing the Right Thing: Single Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1,
(1987).
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complete process - one that includes aspects of business and education, as well
as notions of "fairness" that address matters usually beyond the law. This article
discusses some of the major policy considerations involved in the districting
process for the New York City Council. It also discusses the interaction of law
and politics that underscored many significant decisions made by the Commission.
It seeks to explain how the Commission arrived at these decisions in spite of the
sometimes incongruous ideas and concerns of individual commissioners.
Section two expands on some of the ground rules that the Chair of the
Commission set at the start of the Commission's work. The ground rules set the
tone and momentum under which the Commission operated. Section three considers the structure devised by the 1989 Charter Revision Commission for the
fifteen-member Districting Commission. That structure set requirements and
priorities, but also provided for flexibility and judgment. Section four discusses
the significant policy deliberations and decisions in the Commission's districting
process. Section five deals with some of the decisions made by the Commission
that were made primarily for minority empowerment. Finally, section six concludes that a fair result can be achieved if the Commission is faithful to the
process.
II. THE POWER OF THE CHAIR IN SETTING BOUNDARIES:
REALISTIC GOALS OF POLITICAL FAIRNESS AND THE LAW
The overriding consideration of the chief decision-makers in this process was
that the Commission do what was "right." The right thing, or long term objective,
envisioned the Commission producing a fair plan that was faithful to the
requirements of the New York City Charter - which included as its first and
second criteria, respectively, fidelity to the one person, one vote requirement 8
and that the plan comply with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. 9 In
addition, the Commission also needed to satisfy the political community in which
it operated. Considering all the political workings invariably contained in the
redistricting process, this last objective was easier said than done.
The most general sense in which the Commission strove for a "fair" result
was with the idea that an expanded Council (from thirty-five to fifty-one members)
would provide at least sixteen new opportunities for representation. The Commission actively sought to identify and define communities that previously had
been submerged within the larger political groupings. This meant listening carefully at public hearings of the Commission and responding to the testimony. As
a result, a view of who was left out of the political process emerged. The
Commission considered the traditional categories of excluded minorities based
upon the views and attitudes of elites, those used to describing political reality
for the rest of us. However, the Commission hearings brought a different
perspective to the process. The Commission saw that in order to enfranchise
within the mandate it had, it had to go beyond the more traditional litany of
minorities. Like an intricate puzzle, it took thousands of pieces of testimony to
put the plan together. The open process had a decided impact. Those who asked

8.
9.

NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., NEW YORK CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A,
CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(b).

§

52(a) (1989).
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for empowerment often received it, including Caribbean Blacks, Dominican
Hispanics, gays and lesbians, emerging communities within larger neighborhoods,
and even Republicans, whose number on the City Council increased from one to
five after the process was completed. In sum, what the Commission endeavored
to do was to enhance the local political process so that its beneficiaries would
be those who could present their claim for political representation. A simple yet
integral part of that endeavor meant granting people the opportunity to be heard
and taking what they said to heart.
Obstacles abounded, especially because individual members of the Commission had been chosen with due consideration of their own agendas. The chair's
working theory was that a highly diverse and capable group of concerned city
residents needed to be brought together to achieve a new level of openness and
inclusion in the local political process. While actions of individual members of
the Commission did not always reflect this theory, the chair strove to keep
coalitions from forming on the Commission by working constantly at the process
in the way called for by the New York City Charter. Working at tasks, such as
using the computer in a "hands-on" manner, built confidence among members
and the integrity of the body itself. Mutual respect was a constant and no one
was excluded, even though, by the end of the process, a substantial majority had
well-founded views of who had behaved in ways that might have warranted
exclusion.
Those members who could not see the agenda of the Commission in terms
of the general good basically excluded themselves by their own refusal to
participate with open minds. By tending to the task at hand, the Commission
did not get mired in the many factional issues raised by the various lawsuits
filed 10 and the constant media attention to issues and events extraneous to the
creation of a successful districting plan.
The Commission leadership viewed the process as an education for members
of the Commission. The Chair, for example, used his experiences as a professor
in several disciplines to infuse a variety of perspectives into defining the task at
hand for the Commission." His experience as a professor of business gave him
a good sense of organization and the need to have systems in the process of
adopting the plan. This skill helped immensely in terms of early staffing, creating
an organizational structure, securing an appropriate budget, obtaining space,
securing and testing sophisticated computer equipment, and working back from
the deadlines by adopting appropriate milestones. To appreciate the enormity of
this task, one need only consider the failure of the New York State Senate and
Assembly to agree on a congressional districting plan. After more than two years
of trying to create a plan politically palatable to both houses of the state's
legislature, with an expenditure measured by millions of dollars, they reached a
stalemate with no compromise in sight. In that situation, many former members
of the Commission, including both authors, the two Vice-Chairs of the Com10. Several of these lawsuits are noted and briefly discussed infra in Part V.
11. Frank J. Macchiarola has been a Professor of Business at Columbia University, Professor
of Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Professor of
Education at the Teachers College at Columbia University and Adjunct Professor of Public Administration at Baruch College of the City University of New York.
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mission," as well as the former Executive Director, were called in by the State
Supreme Court to do that job. They accomplished it in approximately two weeks,
using much of the key personnel and techniques that were used in the New York
City Council districting at a cost of approximately $200,000.
The Chair had also served as Chancellor of the New York City Public
Schools. This experience gave him the sense that the process of districting itself
was also about teaching one another as they advanced toward the goal. Keeping
an open mind, one willing to listen and be educated, was part of the responsibility
of the Commission and its chair. Fundamentally, most of the fifteen commissioners who participated in the process emerged as different people as a result
of the education they gained on the Commission. Significantly, those members
who voted against the final plan were, as is discussed below, "single issue"
Commissioners who would not compromise on particular issues, or who had
"bottom line" commitments that they could not compromise. The Commission
plan had to proceed from what it learned. Going into the process there could be
no absolutes. Fidelity to the process did not permit it.
As a practitioner and professor of law, the fidelity to a system of rules
imposed upon the Commission by law was extremely important to the Chair.
While the Chair believed that the Voting Rights Act had been carried out beyond
the point it should have by the case law and practice, resulting in extreme
gerrymandering in some cases, the Chair was committed to applying the law as
best it could be determined. The Voting Rights Act has not always been clearly
interpreted, and several questions regarding its application remain "open," particularly as relating to New York City's many minorities. Nevertheless, the Chair
had to adopt a posture requiring the Commission to deal with the legal issues,
and not forward them to the judiciary. It was, the Chair believed, incumbent on
public officials who take an oath to abide by the law not to excuse themselves
from this oath of office by having judges do their work. In short, the Chair did
not always agree with the law nor would he have necessarily followed the same
process it required. Still, the Commission maintained fidelity to the law the same
way that lawyers tell their clients that they have to pay taxes that the tax code
provides for, even though one may not agree with the tax code.
Finally, there were city-wide political contacts and associates the Chair had
established. As head of the New York City public school system from 1978 to
1983 and, later, in his run for City Comptroller in 1989, the Chair had developed
political contacts and some credibility with many politicians. He used those
contacts for informal discussions about the Commission's work and the expectations that many had about its results. The Commission had to get its work
and problems understood so that its final plan could be judged in those terms.
The Commission had to set the stage for the. evaluation and acceptance of its
results.
In sum, it was to the Chair's advantage, as the leader of the Commission,
to build as much confidence in the Commission and its work as he could in the
12. Esmeralda Simmons, who served as one of the two Vice Chairs on the Districting Commission,
was originally enlisted to act as one of the three redistricting experts to the team of Referees who
were assembled by the State Supreme Court to draw the State's congressional districts. However, she
opted instead to serve as legal counsel to one of the parties in the yarious lawsuits that this process
spurred.
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public at large, the "influentials," the academics and law professionals, and even
the media. He wanted to show these groups what the Commission planned to
do, that its goal was an open one, subject to change when needed, and to allow
them to play a role in the development of this plan. Part of this desire meant
the Commission consistently met with community leaders, people representing
political interests, public interest groups, and often, representatives of the media
to explain the Commission's job. Even though the New York City Charter itself
provided that the Commission would approve and adopt a plan without interference from the City Council,13 the Chair still felt the requirement of consensus
beyond the scope of the fifteen members of the Commission. To take a different
approach, that is, to somehow satisfy the political agendas of the fifteen individual
commissioners, 14 would not only have resulted in a dramatically different plan;
it would have resulted in the type of plan that the Charter Revision Commission
- which articulated the criteria by which the Commission had to create a plan
- desired to prevent.
III.

NEW RULES FOR NEW RESULTS

Since the process involved creating an entirely new plan for city council
representation, the 1989 Charter Revision Commission (the "Schwarz Commission") had the forethought to call the Commission a "districting" as opposed
to a "redistricting" commission. This name reflected the fact that not only would
the Commission consider the U.S. Census in drawing new lines for council
districts, but perhaps more importantly, the Commission was charged with
specifying the communities to be empowered by the change in the legislative
functions of the council.
Under the revised New York City Charter, the council had become the city's
sole legislative body, replacing the formerly powerful Board of Estimate in several
of its key functions, including land use, franchise, and contract matters. 5 As a
result of the invalidation of the Board of Estimate, the Schwarz Commission
increased the size of the City Council to empower minority communities. This
New York City Charter made this charge explicit and required in its ranked
criteria the "fair and effective representation of minorities.' ' 6 This goal was
second only to the one person, one vote requirement. 7
The Schwarz Commission also delineated other criteria to be used in creating
districts."8 These criteria included neighborhoods and communities, 9 political
affiliations, 20 and a limit on borough crossings in the creation of multi-county
13. This power reverts to the council in 1993. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, §§ 51(c) & 51(d).
14. The Commissioners were, after all, political appointees. This matter is discussed later in this
article.
15. In Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 702 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court, affirming
decisions below, ruled that the Board of Estimate, a quasi-legislative body that existed alongside the
City Council, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court based its
ruling on the fact that the Board's composition and voting structure violated the one person, one
vote requirement. Each Borough President had one vote on the Board despite the fact that the
populations and proportions of minorities of each borough varied considerably.
16. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(l)(b).
17. CrrY CHtARTR ch. 2-A, § 52(l)(a).
18. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 51(a)-(g).
19. CITY CHARTR ch. 2-A, § 52(l)(d).
20. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(l)(f).
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districts. 21 The Commission adhered to the criteria in their listed order, as the
22
Charter required.
The use of an independent committee made the process more elaborate than
prior redistrictings. Being "independent" meant that once the City Council and
Mayor had appointed the representatives, as is discussed below, the City Council
and Mayor lost control of the process. Of course, the process was more complicated than that, and both council members and people connected with the mayor's
office had lines into the Commission's work. Still, the Commission was free
from more direct influence that past New York City Charters had provided for
in the redistricting commissions they established. On some of these commissions,
virtually all the members were mayoral appointees. On others, the commission
was essentially advisory and the Council adopted the final districting map.
The Schwarz Commission attempted to ensure independence by structuring
the Commission in a diverse and politically balanced manner. Of the fifteen
unpaid Commissioners, eight were to be appointed by the Council and seven
were to be appointed by the Mayor. Of the council appointees, five were to be
appointed by the majority party, the Democrats, and three were appointed by
the minority party. 23 The mayoral appointees were also required to be politically
diverse in that the Mayor could not create a Commission with a majority (eight)
of its members belonging to any one party. This Charter requirement resulted in
a Commission consisting of seven Democrats, five Republicans, a Liberal party
member, a member of the Conservative party, and an independent member.
As to who would chair the Commission, the usual practice of partisan
selection was not possible, because the Charter prohibited a majority of any one
party. Indeed, only seven Democrats on a fifteen person Commission in New
York City was quite an extraordinary event. The departure from the traditional
political structure was also exhibited in the racial/ethnic/gender/geographic breakdown of the Commission. A majority of its members were non-white; the
Commission included four African American Commissioners, three Hispanic
Commissioners, and one Asian American Commissioner. 24 The Commission also
included five women. Geographically, as among the City's five boroughs, five
members were from The Bronx, two were from Staten Island, four were from
Brooklyn, two were from Queens, and only two were from Manhattan. Again,
these features set the Commission far apart from the City's prior practices.
In addition, the Commission abandoned the customary voting protocol in
the hope of achieving "fairer" results. The New York City Charter sought fairer
results by requiring that the Commission had to adopt its plan by a supermajority. 25 This required nine members voting affirmatively for the Commission's

21.

CITY CHARTER

25.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 2-A, § 52(l)(c).

22. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1) ("The following paragraphs [listing the criteria] shall be
applied and given priority in the order in which they are listed.").
23. CITy CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 50(a)-(g).
24. The City Charter required this racial and ethnic diversity. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, §
50(b)(l)(b). "The commission shall have among its members . . . members of the racial and language
minority groups in New York City which are protected by the United States Voting Rights Act of
nineteen hundred and sixty-five, as amended, in proportion, as close as practicable, to their population
in the city." Id. See infra note 47.
ch. 2-A, § 51(g).
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plan to be adopted. 26 Given the diversity of the Commissioners, the fact that
eleven members voted to adopt the final plan attested to its broad support.
The Charter required the Commission to elect one of its members to serve
as chair of the Commission. 27 There was also a battle for the chair, but eventually
Frank J. Macchiarola was elected by a vote of eight to six. As an accommodation
to other blocs, the Commission also elected two vice-chairs. To maintain the
balance on the Commission, a Democratic mayoral appointee and a Republican
council appointee were elected unanimously as the vice-chairs. From that point,
part of the Chair's personal authority was at risk, but necessarily so because of
the kind of leadership that would be required to accomplish the task. "Power
of the chair" issues arose immediately. Who would be the executive director?
Who would be on the staff? The Chair turned to the work of the Charter
Revision Commission. That Commission had vested the power in the Chair,
subject to recommendation by the Commission. The Chair urged the members
to adopt that method for the Commission and was granted the authority to make
staffing and other. significant decisions. This meant that the Commission was less
likely to get bogged down in personal or political controversy.
Finally, the Schwarz Commission created a timetable from which the Commission had to work backwards. 2 It was an incredible timetable. The City
Council had a November 1991 election date and a September 1991 primary. The
final plan for the districts had to be submitted for Department of Justice approval
in early June. 29 However, the Commission did not expect to receive the 1990
census data until approximately three months earlier, in March of 1991. Within
that short period, the Commission had twenty-seven public hearings in all five
boroughs and hundreds of meetings with concerned community groups throughout
New York City.
In its relatively short -life span as a governmental agency, the Commission
also had to acquire the technology and expertise for computer-based redistricting.
In this regard, given the ten year gap in redistrictings and the early election that
required districting, the Commission helped set the standard for both state and
local redistrictings and reapportionment that were soon to follow. Technology
and its application were not where the Commission needed it to be - a real
assault on this kind of a problem had not occurred since 1980 - so the
Commission lacked the required technology at the time the Commission was
created. All of that work had to be done, and was in fact accomplished on
schedule. The Chair knew the Commission would never finish all of its work on
time if assertive leadership was not used from the start, long before most realized
the time for rapid action had arrived.
IV.

DEVELOPING A FAIR PROCESS: POLICY DECISIONS ON THE
COMMISSION

The Commission viewed the work before it as a set of problems or issues
that it had to resolve. The first and foremost was keeping the process fair.30 As
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

CITY CHARTER ch.
CITY CHARTER ch.
CITY CHARTER ch.
CITY CHARTER ch.
CITY CHARTER ch.

2-A,
2-A,
2-A,
2-A,
2-A,

§
§
§
§
§

51(g).
50(a)(6).
51(c)-(g).
51(1)(c).
52(1)(b).
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noted earlier, that the process produced a fair result can be gleaned from the
diversity of the council elected in November of 1991: going into this process,
twenty-five percent of the council was minority. That figure rose to forty percent
after the election. At the same time, some disappointing results occurred as well.
The Commission was clearly frustrated by the fact that although seven percent
of the City's population is Asian, the Asians could not have that strength
reflected through redistricting. The demographics could not support a predominantly Asian district, although the entire Commission had worked extremely hard
to find a way of producing that result."
Nonetheless, fairness in the results and adherence to the rules were the focus
of the Commission's work. As indicated above, the Charter had established those
rules and the Commission had the obligation to operate within them.12 Fairness
also had to be defined by the Department of Justice, which would have to
approve the plan before it could be implemented. 3 Indeed, nothing the Commission could have done would have immunized it from the criticism that its
final plan would generate from the Justice Department. When the Justice Department first turned down the plan, based on minor failures to conform to the
Voting Rights Act, the Commission's leadership felt strongly that its reasons for
doing so had been inappropriately based on satisfying long term political aspirations. Still, the leadership did not let pride or exasperation get in the way of
having an approved districting plan for New York City on schedule. Rather than
comment, the defects were cured within a week and in the end, the Commission
had created a plan that the Department of Justice approved.
A.

Members of the Commission

Four professors led the Commission: besides the Chair, who was teaching
at Columbia University, Vice Chair Esmeralda Simmons taught at Medgar Evers
College at the City University of New York ("CUNY"), Vice Chair Michael
Petrides was a professor at Staten Island College, also part of CUNY and the
Commission's Executive Director, Dr. Alan Gartner, was head of research at the
Graduate Center of CUNY. Commissioner Simmons came with an extensive
background in the voting rights area, having been lead and co-counsel on a
number of significant voting rights matters. Commissioner Petrides was, and
remains, a member of the New York City Board of Education. He was also
active in Republican party politics. Finally, Dr. Gartner had experience in the
civil rights arena, marching in Selma, Mississippi three decades earlier.
In addition to these people, the Commission made it a policy to look for
outside experts in the areas of redistricting and voting rights. Notable experts
included Professor Bernard Grofman of the University of California; Professor
Lani Guinier of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Robert Bailey of
Columbia University; and Professor John Mollenkopf, a political scientist from
the Graduate School of the City University of New York. In addition, Judith
Reed, of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, was retained as Counsel. The
31. The Asian population in New York City was too dispersed to allow the Commission to
create an "Asian Majority" district.
32. CIrY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
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Commission, notwithstanding its experts, fixed its efforts on accomplishing the
task rather than showing the community at large how intelligent a team could
be brought together. The work of these experts largely corresponded to the
initiatives that were developed through public hearings.
As for other staff, on which the Commission's credibility would depend,
they consisted of persons who had community experience. The staff and advisors
were chosen with an appreciation for the kind of diversity that was critical to
the Commission and its work.
B.

Dealing with Incumbency in the Districting Process

One of the most controversial policy decisions that had to be dealt with was
the extent to which incumbency would be a factor in the redistricting process.
The Council members and leadership sought a minimum amount of change.
Within this concern was the question of how minority incumbents would be
treated in the process. As the Charter was silent as to the "appropriate" measure
of attention these matters would be accorded, 34 it became a personal issue for
many members of the Commission. The desire for stability and continuity of
representation had to be balanced by the requirements of change, and the process
had to evolve as philosophical positions began to give way to the need to actually
reach a workable consensus.
Difficulties arose because many of those with input to the process, but not
with decision making authority, confused issues of the candidate's rights and
voters' rights. The Commission made an early commitment to voters' rights in
general and to the empowerment of the most seriously under-represented communities in particular. It did so because of the requirement of the New York
City Charter 3 and the Voting Rights Act. a6 Although some members of the
Commission went along with that position because they believed in it, others had
to brought along because the charter required it. Not all mounted the learning
curve and those that mounted it did not all do so at the same time. That
commitment would clearly cause anguish among many incumbents and many
interested parties. Some incumbents and interested parties appeared to understand
this outcome while others found the results less appealing. Even the New York
Times sounded a cautionary note, urging incumbency protection to be accorded
an enhanced entitlement, 37 even if one could not be found among the several
38
ranked criteria listed in the Charter.
In several instances, major incumbency issues were raised. In two of these
cases particularly strong allies of Council Speaker Peter Vallone, Council Member
Jerry Crispino of the Bronx and Council Member Joseph Lisa had to be placed

34.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 2-A,

35.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 2-A,

§ 52.

§ 52.

36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1988).
37. See Voting Vengeance, N.Y. Ttmss, July 30, 1991, at A2, stating that, "New York City's
Districting Commission was chided last week for a racial gerrymander that denied a white incumbent
a chance to run in her current minority area. It now has replaced the gerrymander with new lines
that can only be designed to punish the incumbent, Susan Alter, for having complained." While
acknowledging that the Commission had no legal obligation to respond to Ms. Alter's complaints,
the editorial nonetheless labelled the Commission's action "shameful."

38.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 2-A,

§ 52.
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in districts where their positions were in jeopardy. The Voting Rights Act clearly
mandated this result.3 9 Still, the Speaker held the political power to derail the
process. He chose not to, agreeing that the law had to be given priority. He
agreed to abide by the legal judgment of the Commission. The two Council
members did not run for reelection while the Speaker demonstrated real leadership
at a critical point in the process.
In other instances, as with Council Member Susan Alter, a particularly
important political balance by districts created in the remainder of Brooklyn
resulted in severe adjustments to the district that she formerly represented. In
this situation, the incumbency of one Council member was deemed less important
than a compromise which gave Voting Rights Act protection to districts where
minorities resided, and saw accommodation with the rest of the borough's council
members.
The issue of incumbency protection reduced itself to the question of whether
the Commission was creating fifty-one districts, or sixteen "new" districts.
Ultimately, the Commission grew comfortable with the perspective of "districting" from scratch as opposed to "redistricting" to accommodate new members.
On the other hand, the Commission did not go out of its way to disregard prior
district lines. After all, the thirty-five council members were the elected representatives of the former districts. The theory that emerged saw the commission as
not adjusting thirty-five district lines "down" and plugging in new districts where
there was space. The view that emerged saw the Commission creating fifty-one
new districts.
The Commission had to reach a delicate balance, a balance between the duty
it owed to the public, as provided in the Charter, 40 and the political expectations
of the council members, many of whom were not opposed to the concept of
redistricting as long as it essentially preserved "their" district lines. For most of
the Commissioners, this was a learning process, and one that evolved throughout
the Commission's existence. In the end, only after the requirements of the Voting
Rights Act were satisfied, and the concerns of the under-represented were weighed,
did the Commission consider, as was its legal right, 4' incumbency.
C.

Public Hearings and Open Process

Another significant policy decision of the Commission was to provide a large
amount of openness and sharing of its resources with the public. This unprecedented accessibility has already been followed by others. Indeed, it affected the
way reapportionment was done in New York State. As a response to New York
City's experience, the State Commission scheduled hearings throughout New York
State during its recent reapportionment, and some modest gains of input by
citizens occurred.
As part of this process of openness, the Commission scheduled its twentyseven public hearings so that it could receive public response at each stage of
the districting process. The Commission also held hearings prior to the initial
39.

42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988).

40. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 51.
41. See e.g., White v. Weisler, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89
n.16 (1966).
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plan, primarily to get a sense of how communities defined themselves. It also
held hearings between the time of its initial plan and the Commission's release
of its revised plan two weeks later. Again, the Commission held hearings after
it released its revised plan and after it released its final plan on June 6, 1991.
Every revision in the plan incorporated some comments or criticisms that were
expressed during this hearing process. The Commission held twenty-seven hearings, almost four times the number required under the revised Charter.42 Additionally, the Commission's representatives and community liaisons attended over
500 meetings with community organizations to explain the process and how it
affected those organizations and their members. The Commission sought the
organizations' participation because it earnestly wanted to know what they thought
and to have their opinions available as it formulated the plan.
D.

Activity of All Commissioners

The Commission's notion of "fairness" also required that each Commissioner
play an active role in the process. Every Commissioner had the kind of access
that one would desire and expect from someone charged with producing a plan.
All Commissioners were invited to, and actually did use the computers to develop
the type of plans that they thought fair. They shared and accessed the same
data, and just as importantly, each Commissioner had access to the technical
personnel who utilized the computer programs and the data to create districting
alternatives. The Commission decided early on that its members would physically
draw the plan. While it gave some deference to the borough from which particular
Commissioners came, for purposes of convenience, the hierarchy of the Commission was flattened as all members were invited to participate in every group
activity. While Commissioners who dissented might not have liked the results,
they could not legitimately complain that they were unable to present their
viewpoint.
The Commission had an extremely novel policy of allowing public access to
all of its computer capability. As noted above, the Commission actively sought
public input and very seriously considered it. The Commission provided a "public
access terminal" computer station ("P.A.T.") and provided computer personnel
to assist any member of the public that desired to use this service. The Commission
also made data available to the public, including the census data, almost as soon
as the Commission received it. This was done at the lowest price possible, usually
only the cost of the computer disks onto which the data was copied. The P.A.T.
was housed in the City University Center Graduate Center in mid-town Manhattan. Indeed, most of the plans that the Commission received from the public to
consider were generated on its machines and based upon the Commission's census
and other data.
Finally, the chair felt that the Commission could develop and maintain a
policy of never ending a public hearing until everyone who signed up to speak
had the opportunity to be heard. A quorum was always present to start Commission hearings, although it was not required.4 1 Occasionally at 2:00 a.m.

42.
43.

CIrT CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 51(a).
CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 51(b).
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members of the Commission would still be listening to people's opinions about
what they thought should be done with their particular community or neighborhood. The Commission had over 1,500 pieces of testimony from these hearings
alone. Some were submitted in document form, while most were received orally
as testimony. In sum, the openness and access were important aspects of the
Commission's policy of fairness. This was not only because it wanted a fair
result, but also because the Commission wanted to increase the participation of
people in the political process. Raising the level of public participation remains
an important part of the political legacy of the Commission's work. It remains
incorporated in the product of the Commission, its final districting plan, as well.
V.

CRITICAL ISSUES OF POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT
The first "critical" issue in the districting process was what is usually known
in political science as a "non-event." That non-event was that neither the Mayor
nor the City Council interfered in the direct workings of the Commission. Of
course, both the Commission's leadership and individual members received telephone calls attempting to have a boundary drawn in a particular fashion or to
influence the Commission in some other way. The influence of mayoral representatives and council members was almost entirely limited to an extent not
before recognized in the City's local redistricting experience. The Commission
was left to its own devices, and it alone was responsible for the results achieved.
The structure provided in the New York City Charter," and the Commission's
authority to adopt the lines allowed those results to occur. Of course, the results
angered several of the council members who insisted that they somehow had the
right to define the boundaries of their own district. However, because they could
not point towards legal authority to force the Commission's hand in that manner
and they lacked political authority as well, the Commission did not respond as
they would have liked.
The most controversial aspect of the Commission's work did not involve
those white incumbents who argued that the Commission was undertaking a form
of reverse discrimination. Rather, it was the issue of political competition among
minorities. The most troubling aspect for the Commission was that many in the
minority community viewed the work as a numbers game and saw only the "big
picture." For example, the Hispanic community leaders urged that as almost a
quarter of the city's population, they should have twenty-five percent (or thirteen
seats) of the Council's membership. The reality of the situation was much more
complex and included issues of patterns of geography and integration, citizenship
rates, voter turnout rates, specific ethnic subgroups within the larger minority
categories of "Black," "Hispanic," and "Asian," and even the census undercount.
One of the biggest obstacles for the Hispanic community leaders to overcome
before they accepted the districting plan was the number of districts allotted to
the African American community. The under-representation of Hispanics, who
account for approximately twenty-four percent of the city's population, occurred
basically because of demographics. The Hispanic community is significantly more
geographically dispersed than the African-American community, who are roughly
44.

CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 50.
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twenty-five percent of the population in New York City. This meant that it was

more difficult for the Commission to create "Hispanic majority" districts than
it was to draw corresponding African-American districts. The line drawing around
Hispanic districts resulted from the Commission's attempts to create strong
Hispanic districts.
Nine Hispanic Council members were elected as compared to twelve AfricanAmericans. The reason greater geographic dispersal resulted in fewer Hispanic
than African-American representatives, although the population size was roughly
equivalent, was because the rules of the Charter bound the Commission. The

rules specifically state that the Commission must work within a single-member
district system. A single-member district system is geography-based and resulted
in less electoral opportunity for Hispanics than for Blacks, who could be found
in greater concentrations on the Commission's maps.
The situation was more difficult for the city's most dispersed minority group
- Asian-Americans. With seven percent of the city's total population, simple
mathematical application of a formula would mean at least three council seats.
Still, issues of citizenship, voting age and geographic dispersal made it impossible

for even one Asian-American district to be created.
Another problem in the creation of heavily Hispanic or Asian districts is
that many members of these communities are not, as relatively new emigrants to
the United States, citizens of the United States. Thus even where the Commission
could draw strong Hispanic districts at the voting age population, as it did in
the county of Queens, when the district was analyzed at the "estimated registered
voter" level, the possibility of electing a minority candidate of choice dropped
45
precipitously.

45. For example, past elections in New York City had shown that a minimum of 80% combined
minority total population in a council district was required before a minority candidate would be
elected. As originally drawn, District 21 in the borough of Queens had a combined Black, Hispanic
and Asian population less than 80%. The Districting Commission was concerned that despite coming
close to the 80% minority population threshold, the minority community of District 21 would not
be able to elect a candidate of its choice. Coupled with this concern was the fact that in District 21,
containing the communities of Corona, Jackson Heights and East Elmhurst, large concentrations of
non-citizen Hispanics resided. High proportions of non-citizens meant simply that "extra" minorities
would have to be included to avoid dilution of the Hispanics' voting strength. Accordingly, the
Commission included a heavily Black housing complex in the final version of that plan. In an effort
to create a true minority district which would possibly elect a Black rather than have a purportedly
Hispanic district that would probably elect a white, the commission increased the number of minorities
by reducing the proportion of Hispanics and increasing the proportion of Blacks between the May
16 revised draft plan and the June 3 final plan. The Commission accomplished this increase by
including the heavily African-American housing development called Lefrak City. The result was a
district with the non-minority registered voter percentage at 30.3% rather than 36.3%. The Commission
assumed, as the data suggested, that African-Americans are generally more politically cohesive with
Hispanics than with non-minorities. Thus, the Commission designed a district it thought would best
reflect the political opportunity of the minority communities in that district.
Hispanic groups were displeased with the final district as drawn, and made their displeasure
known to the Justice Department. These groups argued that such a move resulted in a dilution of
the otherwise secure minority district. The Justice Department agreed with Hispanic organizations
that this was a dilution of the Hispanic vote in Queens. Accordingly, the Commission adjusted the
district to look more like the one presented in its May 16, 1992 revised plan. In the Commission's
final plan, District 21 contains a Hispanic voting age population of 53.2%, although its Hispanic
estimated voter registration is only 24.5%. In this particular district, however, a Black candidate was
elected to the Council.
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Interestingly, although somewhat disheartening, one of the strongest barriers
to Hispanic representation on the Council was that community's own leadership
both inside and outside of the Commission. Some of the Hispanic leaders' goals
often conflicted with the stated goals of the Commission. This conflict worked
against securing representatives for the Hispanic community. This leadership
conflict along with geographic dispersal resulted in the Hispanic community
electing seventeen percent of the Council even though they represent twenty-four
percent of the city's population.
Paradoxically, the Charter requirement that the composition of the Districting
Commission closely parallel the racial and ethnic diversity of the city's population6
provided an additional problem for the Commission. 47 In practice, the Charter
required that if a person was chosen as a member of the Commission and was
Hispanic, Black or Asian, that person was chosen as a Hispanic, Black or Asian
Commissioner. This implied that a minority Commissioner was an advocate for
a particular racial or ethnic group, and sent the message that non-minorities or
even other minorities should keep their "hands off" the Commissioner. This
problem of "selective representation" is a much larger societal issue of course,
but at the more basic level of the work of a commission, its negative effects can
be devastating. The question can be posed as follows: When we have selected
representation on a political body, are we then excusing the rest of the Commissioners from representing all citizens and excusing them from that area of
involvement? That could have been a difficult issue for the Commission. Over
time, involvement of every Commissioner on every issue became the norm. All
the Commissioners represented all of city's diverse residents, and the Commission
would create the type of plan that reflected that belief.
When an Hispanic representative argued, for example, that three "safe"
Hispanic districts were all that could be drawn, and the bulk of the Commission
thought that the numbers said that it could create four, the Commission did not
give a preference to her argument. Most of the Commission was committed to,
indeed viewed as a duty, fair representation. Here, the concept of fairness and
representation outweighed the importance of constituency and who appointed the
Commission. Just as society would not benefit from a United States Supreme
Court Justice that forever remembered who it was that appointed her to the
Court, the Commission would not benefit from those who remained too loyal to
their personal interests or the interests of their sponsors.
The second set of issues for the Commission to define, beyond its responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act, were certain political rights. The Voting
Rights Act secures rights for those people who are entitled to representation. 48
46. Crrv CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 50(b)(1).
47. On August 3, 1992, Judge Mary Johnson Lowe of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York declared unconstitutional and void the City Charter provision requiring
the racial composition of the Districting Commission to reflect the city's racial and ethnic diversity.
Judge Lowe based her ruling on the grounds that the measure is too rigid, has no expiration date,
and harms innocent people who might be precluded from serving on future districting commissions.
Ravitch v. City of New York, 90 Civ. 5752 (S.D.N.Y). The ruling has no effect on the results of
the 1991 elections that occurred under the 1990 Districting Commission's council lines since the
plaintiffs, at the commencement of their action, indicated their opposition to the Charter requirements
and not to the members who were chosen pursuant to it.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1988).
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The question for the Commission was how to provide representation for those
under-represented communities who do not have enough population to form
single member districts, but who are nonetheless entitled to protection under the
philosophy of the Voting Rights Act and its ethos. The notion of minority
"influence" districts had, at the time of the Council districting, been answered
differently by different federal circuit courts.4 9 However, in the Second Circuit,
the issue was open.
The Commission answered the question by adopting a policy of maintaining
communities of similar ethnic, racial, economic, and "other" traits together. It
went beyond affording that protection to only those categories enumerated in
the Voting Rights Act.5 0 That policy meant that the Commission was not only
sensitive to Brooklyn's black population, but to the Caribbean blacks whose
political aspirations did not always coincide with those of the American Blacks.
Thus, the Caribbean black community now has a representative of its choosing
on the City Council. Additionally, the Commission did not only pay attention
to Hispanics in general, but also to upper Manhattan's Dominicans, who also
for the first time have a representative on the Council.
The policy also meant paying attention to the gay community, which had
never had representation on the Council. Currently, two members of the City
Council are openly gay, including one that ran on a platform specifically targeted
to the special political needs of the gay community. The Commission also kept
the clusters of Orthodox Jews together. Nothing in the law mandated that the
Commission weigh such considerations and make these decisions. However, the
communities came to the hearings and voiced their concerns. They presented data
to sustain their positions. The Commission districted them together for reasons
that had to do with their empowerment and entitlement. Putting aside the issue
of whether or not they benefitted from the representation that they ultimately
received in the 1991 election, their testimony was listened to and the Commission
responded.
Another issue was that of "open" districts: in which areas should the
Commission concentrate those districts in which no incumbent resided, largely
due to the increase in the number of Council seats? The Commission realized
that incumbency would be an important factor in who was elected in what
districts, and determined to create as many open districts as possible for minority
citizens to elect candidates of their choice. Seventeen open districts resulted from
the increase in the size of the Council and incumbents deciding not to run for
reelection. Of those seventeen districts, twelve were created in predominantly
minority areas with the desire of having those "minority districts" elect candidates
of their choice.

49. See Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991). Cf. McNeil v. Springfield Park
District, 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988); Latino Political Action Committee v. City of Boston, 784
F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1986); Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista, 723 F. Supp. 1384, 1391 (S.D. Cal. 1989);
East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, 703 F. Supp. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1989); Martin v.
Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1204 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
50. The Voting Rights Act protects persons whose right to vote is denied or abridged "on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in § 1973b(f)(2) of this
title," which protects members of language minority groups. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1988).
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One pleasant and unexpected pattern that emerged from the 1991 Council
election was the changes in voting patterns. Interestingly, prior to the 1991
election, no minority council member had ever been elected from a district that
was less than 80% "minority." The "80% rule" held true of every minority
member on the City Council until the election of November of 1991. After that
election, the Council had four minority members that were elected from districts
with less than 80% minorities. This result reflects new coalition building, increased
minority electoral participation and expanding cross-racial electoral support.
Coalition building was also something the Commission considered and tried
to encourage. However, the Commission's work spurred various court cases;
three lawsuits in particular played a critical role in this attempt to bring people
together. Conversely, the actions raised divisive issues that fostered hostility and
created political rifts as well.
In Alter v. The City of New York, 5 the picture painted by some was of
Caribbean blacks versus Orthodox Jews, with the Commission fanning the
hostility between the two communities . 2 However, the Commission tried to do
what would most likely result in an overwhelmingly Black Caribbean community
being able to choose a candidate of its preference. The Commission created an
open minority district, and placed the only two Orthodox Council members, who
lived several blocks apart, in the same district. The media and the Department
of Justice" viewed it as a type of reverse discrimination. The Commission was
asked why it moved a Jewish Orthodox Council member from "her" district to
another district where she would have had to run against another Orthodox Jew,
who was a man. In fact, the Commission did not "move" any incumbent from
one district to another. The Commission created minority districts first, with the
result that these particular incumbents ended up in the same district. Further,
several members of the Commission seeking the opportunity to create an open
district desired just that result. It was a reasonable political position to take, and
the Commission had the responsibility to enhance minority representation. The
main concern of the Commission was not that of the incumbents, but that of
voter empowerment. It was not simply political horse trading at the expense of
4
the rights of any voter.1
51. No. 91-2232 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 19, 1991).
52. The two other lawsuits which raised issues of voting rights in the context of race were Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund v. City of New York, et al., No. 91-2026 (E.D.N.Y. filed
June 7, 1991) and Broad Channel Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. New York City Districting Comm'n, No.
18756/91 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. filed August 13, 1991).
53. In the Department of Justice's initial letter to the Districting Commission objecting to the
final plan, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, John R. Dunne wrote:
Finally, I feel compelled to comment on one factor that may have played a significant
role in drawing some of the districts (particularly District 45). According to published
reports, the Commission believed that to obtain preclearance for the districting plan, it
.was required by the Department of Justice policy to remove current Council members
from any district in which minorities comprise a majority of the population, unless that
incumbent also was a member of the same minority. The proposition that only minority
officeholders may effectively represent a minority constituency does not accurately state
the law or the policy of the Justice Department.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General, John R. Dunne, to Judith Reed, General Counsel to the
Commission (July 19, 1991) (on file with author).
54. As it turned out, Council Member Alter was able to run in the district she wanted to as a
result of a ruling in another lawsuit, Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund v. City of
New York, et al., No. 91-2026 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 19, 1991).
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In the Bronx, as discussed previously, another critical question for the
Commission was whether to create three "safe" Hispanic majority districts or
to divide that same population into four Hispanic majority districts that could
work if the voters turned out to vote. The data suggested that four candidates
of choice could be elected if the Hispanic community got out and voted.,
However, several Commissioners argued for three safe districts. When the entire
Commission went through the process as it had done prior to creation of this
district, clear results emerged that would most empower the Hispanic community,
at least numerically.
The process involved more than just allowing the data to speak for itself.
It also included convincing the neutral Commissioners that to treat the Hispanic
community in the Bronx any other way would not only be patronizing, but
"disempowering." The leadership of the Commission also had to be convinced.
That turning point came when a Commissioner pointed out that he could not in
"good conscience" accept three Hispanic districts when four were a very real
possibility. That was a very persuasive reaction for several members of the
Commission, because it demonstrated the existence of a coalition committed to
doing what was right and fair. That sense of fairness was not based upon the
existing political power structure. Rather, it was based on what the Commission
was required to do under the Voting Rights Act16 and the New York City
Charter.5 7 Ultimately, creating four Hispanic majority Council districts was the
only justifiable political response. Indeed, four Hispanics were elected from those
districts in the 1991 Council elections.
At the end of the process, the final vote on the plan the Commission adopted
was eleven in favor and four against. The vote reflected the coalition building
on the Commission. All three of the Republican Council appointees voted for
it. The Commission was not required to create "Republican" districts, but
geographic clusters and patterns allowed the Commission's work to have that
result. After the election five Republicans, ten percent of the membership, were
elected to the body. Of the mayoral appointees, five supported the plan while
two voted against it. Of the Democratic Council appointees, three voted for it
while two voted against it. One member voted against it based on what he
regarded as the plan's major shortcoming and as a fatal flaw: lack of geographic
compactness. The coalition that formed and held together was as a rare one
indeed, ranging from a member of the Conservative Party to liberal Democrats.
It was a most improbable coalition for a districting plan. Their interest in fair
results and just empowerment unified them.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A discussion concerning districting in New York City could have touched
on a number of issues. It could have touched upon a role for political parties in
55. Indeed, coupled with the technology to maneuver it, the data was extremely helpful in
resolving some of the more difficult district drawing, such as the Latino districts in upper Manhattan
and Queens and the Black districts in Brooklyn, as well as not creating a "Black" district linking
Coney Island and Staten Island.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988).
57. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52.
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the Council. It could have discussed the concept of single-member districts and
why they present an especially difficult challenge for empowering minorities. It
cotild have dealt with at-large seats and proportional representation. Each of
these discussions would present some kind of solution to the issue of increasing
the power of minorities. But that was not the authors' purpose. Having experienced districting on a first hand basis, our challenge was to discuss some realities
of the system as it is and to discuss how the districting process, within the
structure that exists, could advance the cause of minorities who are not yet fully
a part of the political system. We wanted, as well, to shed some light on basic
issues: (1) the organization of the Commission; (2) the role for its members; (3)
the development of a working organization; and (4) its focus upon important
issues, fairness and the New York City Charter requirements.
The districting process inherently involves questions of justice. The work of
the Commission was to evaluate the common goals of the represented and
interested parties, and to foster policies and decisions that emphasized these
common goals. Primary among these goals and policies was representation for
the traditionally under-represented or unrepresented. The Commission focused
on its task, and was faithful to the constitutional, federal and local requirements.
It also exhaustively examined issues on a case-by-case basis. Pursuing that course
allowed the process to evolve as it did, and resulted in the creation of a "fair"
plan, reflecting the Commission's commitment and hard work. It demonstrated
that policy implementation can be faithful to principles.

APPENDIX
CHAPTER 2-A
DISTRICTING COMMISSION
§50.

Districting commission; composition; appointment; terms; vacancies; compensation.
§ 51. Powers and duties of the commission; hearings; submissions and
approval of plan.
§52. District plan; criteria.
§50. Districting Commission; composition; appointment; terms; vacancies; compensation. a. There shall be a districting commission consisting
of fifteen members appointed as provided in this section.
1. The council delegation of the political party which has the largest
delegation in the council shall, by majority vote, appoint five members
of the commission, no more than one of whom may be a resident of
the same borough.
2. The council delegation of the political party which has the second
largest delegation in the council, shall, by majority vote, appoint three
members of the commission, no more than one of whom may be a
resident of the same borough.
3. If only one political party has a council delegation, then the
chairpersons of the county committees of the political party with no
council delegation which, at the time of the general election last preceding the time at which such appointments are required to be made,
had the largest number of enrolled voters in the city, shall each submit
three nominations to the mayor, in order to provide a list of fifteen
nominations from that party. The mayor shall appoint three members
from such list, no more than one of whom may be a resident of the
same borough.
4. The mayor shall appoint seven additional members, but the party
enrollment, if any, of these additional members shall be such that
individuals enrolled in a single political party shall not be a majority
of the total number of members of the commission.
5. Officers and employees of the city or any city agency, lobbyists
required to file a statement of registration under federal, state or local
law, the employees of such lobbyists, federal, state and local elected
officials, and officers of any political party shall not be eligible to be
members of the commission.
6. The members of the commission shall elect one of the fifteen
members to serve as the chair of the commission.
7. For purposes of this section, a member of the council who was
elected to the council upon the nomination of more than one political
party shall be considered to be a member of the council delegation of
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the political party on whose ballot line he or she received the largest
number of votes in his or her last election to the council.
b. 1. The commission shall have among its members (a) at least one
resident of each borough, and (b) members of the racial and language
minority groups in New York city which are protected by the United
States voting rights act of nineteen hundred sixty-five, as amended, in
proportion, as close as practicable, to their population in the city.
2. The mayor, no later than twenty-two months before the general
election of the council to be held in the year nineteen hundred and
ninety-three, and every ten years thereafter, shall convene one or more
meetings of all of the appointing and recommending authorities specified
in subdivision a of this section for the purpose of establishing a screening
and selection process for ensuring that the racial and language minority
groups in New York city which are protected by the United States
voting rights act of nineteen hundred sixty-five, as amended, will be
fairly represented on the commission.
c. Each council delegation authorized by subdivision a of this section
to make appointments to the commission shall make such appointments
no earlier than one year and eight months before, and no later than
one year and six months before, the general election of the council to
be held in the year nineteen hundred ninety-three, and every ten years
thereafter. In any case in which the chairpersons of the county committees of a political party are authorized to submit nominations to the
mayor, such nominations shall be submitted no earlier than one year
and eight months before, and no later than one year and six months
before, the general election of the council to be held in the year nineteen
hundred ninety-three, and every ten years thereafter. The mayor shall
make appointments to the commission after each council delegation
authorized to make appointments has done so but no later than one
year and five months before such a general election of the council. The
commission's term shall end upon adoption of a districting plan, as set
forth in section fifty-one.
d. In the event of a vacancy by death, resignation or otherwise, a new
member enrolled in the same political party from which his or her
predecessor was selected shall be appointed in the same manner as the
member whose departure from the commission created the vacancy to
serve the balance of the term remaining.
e. No member of the districting commission shall be removed from
office except by the person or persons who appointed such member
and only for cause and upon notice and hearing.
f. The members of the commission shall serve without compensation
except that each member shall be allowed actual and necessary expenses
to be audited in the same manner as other city charges.
g. The commission may hire or contract for necessary staff assistance
and may require agencies of city government to provide technical
assistance. The commission shall have a budget as provided by the
mayor.
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New York City Charter
HISTORICAL NOTE
Amended at General Election, November 7, 1989.

§ 51. Powers and duties of the commission; hearings; submissions and
approval of plan. a. Following each decennial census, the commission shall
prepare a plan for dividing the city into districts for the election of council
members. In preparing the plan, the commission shall be guided by the criteria
set forth in section fifty-two.
b. The commission shall hold one or more public hearings not less than one
month before it submits its plan to the city council, in accordance with
subdivision c of this section. The commission shall make its plan available to
the public for inspection and comment not less than one month before the
first such public hearing.
c. The commission shall submit its plan to the city council not less than one
year before the general election of the city council to be held 1 year by general
election in the year nineteen hundred ninety-three and every ten years thereafter.
d. The plan submitted in accordance with subdivision c of this section shall
be deemed adopted unless within three weeks, the council by the vote of a
majority of all of its members adopts a resolution objecting to such plan and
returns the plan to the commission with such resolution and a statement of
its objections, and with copies of the written objections of any individual
members of the council who have submitted objections to the speaker prior
to such date. Any objections from individual members submitted to the speaker
by such date shall be transmitted to the districting commission whether or not
the council objects to such districting plan.
e. Upon the receipt of any such resolution and objections, the commission
shall prepare a revised plan and shall, no later than ten months before such
general election of the city council, make such plan available to the council
and the public for inspection and comment. The commission shall hold public
hearings and seek public comment on such revised plan.
f. Following its consideration of the comments received pursuant to subdivision e of this section, the commission shall, no later than eight months before
such general election of the council, prepare and submit a final plan for the
redistricting of the council.
g. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision d or subdivision f of this
section, no plan shall be deemed adopted in accordance with either of such
subdivisions until the commission files, with the city clerk, a copy of such
plan and a statement signed by at least nine members of the commission
certifying that, within the constraint of paragraph a of subdivision one of
section fifty-two, the criteria set forth in the other paragraphs of such subdivision have been applied in the order in which they are listed and that such
criteria have been implemented, in such order, to the maximum extent practicable. Such certification shall also set forth the manner in which the commission implemented the requirements of paragraph b of subdivision one of
section fifty-two. Such plan shall be deemed adopted upon the commission's
filing with the city clerk of such plan and such certification.
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§ 52. District plan; criteria. 1. In the preparation of its plan for dividing
the city into districts for the election of council members, the commission shall
apply the criteria set forth in the following paragraphs to the maximum extent
practicable. The following paragraphs shall be applied and given priority in
the order in which they are listed.
a. The difference in population between the least populous and the most
populous districts shall not exceed ten percentum (10%) of the average population for all districts, according to figures available from the most recent
decennial census. Any such differences in population must be justified by the
other criteria set forth in this section.
b. Such districting plan shall be established in a manner that ensures the fair
and effective representation of the racial and language minority groups in New
York city which are protected by the United States voting rights act of nineteen
hundred sixty-five, as amended.
c. District lines shall keep intact neighborhoods and communities with established ties of common interest and association, whether historical, racial,
economic, ethnic, religious or other.
d. Each district shall be compact and shall be no more than twice as long as
it is wide.
e. A district shall not cross borough or county boundaries.
f. Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of separating geographic
concentrations of voters enrolled in the same political party into two or more
districts in order to diminish the effective representation of such voters.
g. The districting plan shall be established in a manner that minimizes the
sum of the length of the boundaries of all of the districts included in the plan.
2. Each district shall be contiguous, and whenever a part of a district is
separated from the rest of the district by a body of water, there shall be a
connection by a bridge, a tunnel, a tramway or by regular ferry service.
3. If any district includes territory in two boroughs, then no other district
may also incude territory from the sme two boroughs.
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